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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4398 
 ___________ 
 
 MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
DAVID EBBERT, Warden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:10-cv-02164) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 15, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO,  HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 27, 2011 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Curtis Reynolds, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order denying his habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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I. 
 In 2007, Reynolds was convicted of multiple terrorism-related offenses and 
sentenced by the District Court to 360 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised 
release.  The court also imposed a special assessment of $500.  We affirmed that 
judgment on direct appeal.  See United States v. Reynolds, 374 F. App’x 356, 358 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
 In October 2010, Reynolds filed a pro se habeas petition in the District Court 
pursuant to § 2241.  The petition did not challenge the legality of Reynolds’s conviction 
or sentence.  Rather, it alleged only that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had violated his 
rights by issuing a “restitution payment schedule.”  (See Habeas Pet. 1.)  In support of 
this claim, Reynolds maintained that “only a District Court may set a payment schedule 
for any fine, fee, or restitution.”  (Id. at 3.)  On October 28, 2010, the District Court, 
acting sua sponte, denied the petition as meritless.  In doing so, the court found that 
Reynolds had not been ordered to pay restitution or a fine, and concluded that the BOP 
could indeed establish a payment schedule for collecting the $500 special assessment.  
This appeal followed. 
II.       
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
  In reviewing 
the denial of a § 2241 petition, “[w]e exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
                                                 
1
 Because we agree with the District Court that Reynolds’s habeas petition was 
properly brought under § 2241, he does not need to obtain a certificate of 
appealability to proceed with this appeal.  See United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 
256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).    
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legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.”  See 
O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam).  Having 
considered Reynolds’s arguments, and for substantially the reasons set forth in the 
District Court’s opinion, we agree with the Court’s decision to deny his habeas petition 
on the merits.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
III. 
 We write further here to address the numerous filings that Reynolds has submitted 
to this Court since initiating this appeal.  In these filings, he claims that prison officials at 
the Federal Correctional Institution at Allenwood in Pennsylvania — his current place of 
confinement — have retaliated against him, interfered with his access to the courts, and 
otherwise mistreated him.  He seeks, inter alia, a temporary restraining order prohibiting 
this conduct. 
 Reynolds’s requests for relief are hereby denied without prejudice, as his claims 
are not properly before this Court.  To the extent he wishes to pursue these claims, he 
should file a complaint in the District Court.  We note, however, that Reynolds, a 
frequent litigator in the federal courts, has “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).  
Accordingly, to file a complaint in the District Court, he must either pay the filing fee in 
full or demonstrate that he is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.”  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(g).  We express no opinion on his ability to meet the imminent danger 
standard or prevail on the merits of his claims. 
